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Abstract: The literature on the use of free trade agreements (FTAs) has recently been growing 
because it is becoming more important to encourage the use of current FTAs than to increase the 
number of FTAs. In this paper, we discuss some practical issues in the computation of FTA 
utilization rates, which provide a useful measure to discover how much FTA schemes are used in 
trade. For example, compared with the use of customs data on FTA utilization in imports, when 
using certificates of origin data on FTA utilization in exports, there are several points about which 
we should be careful. Our practical guidance on the computation of FTA utilization rates will be 
helpful when computing such rates and in examining the determinants of those rates empirically. 
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1. Introduction 
     Against the background of the explosive increase in free trade agreements (FTAs), 
it has become more important to encourage FTA utilization in trade. According to the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) website, as of 31 July 2013, around 600 regional 
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trade agreements have been notified to the WTO. FTAs are expected to reduce not only 
tariff rates but also various kinds of non-tariff barriers because recent FTAs include 
various kinds of advanced provisions, such as on intellectual property rights. 
Nevertheless, the primary effect of FTAs on trade is still tariff reduction. The use of an 
FTA will generate benefits for firms in terms of saving on tariff payments as the 
preferential rates are lower than the most favoured nation (MFN) tariff rates. Based on 
the increasing availability of lower FTA preferential rates, it has become more important 
to know the extent of FTA utilization. 
     Recently, there has been a debate on how to measure FTA utilization. Some 
measures have been proposed. The FTA coverage ratio is defined as the share of trade 
values for FTA eligible products in total trade values (Candau et al., 2004). The share of 
trade values under FTA schemes in total trade values has been referred to as the utility 
ratio (Inama, 2003). In measuring FTA utilization, the share of the number of FTA users 
in the total number of trading firms (exporters or importers) is also used in Hayakawa et 
al. (2013a). However, the most widely-used measure on FTA utilization is on a 
value-basis rather than on a number-basis, and it is to measure FTA utilization rates, 
defined as the share of trade values under FTA schemes in total trade values for FTA 
eligible products. For example, Keck and Lendle (2012) analyze the utilization rates of 
both unilateral and bilateral preferences not only by the EU and the US but also by 
Australia and Canada. Hayakawa et al. (2013c) examine the utilization rates of the 
ASEAN-Korea FTA (FTA) using Korea’s imports from ASEAN countries.1 
In this paper, we discuss some practical issues in the computing of FTA utilization 
rates. Keck and Lendle (2012) discuss how to aggregate product-level FTA utilization 
rates into the total FTA utilization rates. They examine three kinds of aggregation. In 
this paper, of the three, we focus on “utilization rates by trade values,” which are 
defined as the share of aggregated trade values for FTA eligible products under FTA 
schemes in the aggregated trade values for FTA eligible products. As discussed in the 
following sections, there are several issues to be considered when computing FTA 
utilization rates. For example, although most of the studies on FTA utilization rates 
compute those in imports by employing customs data on imports according to tariff 
                                                   
1 Most of the studies on utilization rates investigate those of unilateral preferential imports, those in 
the generalized scheme of program (GSP). Bureau et al. (2007) examine GSP utilization as granted 
by the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) to developing countries in the agri-goods 
sector, while Cadot et al. (2006) focus on the trade of the EU and the US with their preferential 
trading partners. Francois et al. (2006) and Manchin (2006) examine the preferential trade relations 
of the EU and non-least-developed African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries under the 
Cotonou Agreement, while Hakobyan (2013) examines US GSP utilization by 143 GSP-eligible 
countries. 
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schemes, it is also possible to compute those in exports by using the information in 
certificates of origin (CoOs). Indeed, Hayakawa (2012) and Hayakawa and 
Laksanapanyakul (2013) use such data for computing FTA utilization rates in exports 
from Thailand. However, compared with the use of customs data, when using CoO data, 
there are several points about which we should be careful. 
     Our practical guidance for the computation of FTA utilization rates will contribute 
to the literature on FTA utilization rates. As mentioned above, that literature has recently 
been growing because it is becoming more important to encourage the use of current 
FTAs than to increase the number of FTAs. Compared with the case of imports, FTA 
utilization in exports has not been exploited much. Given the fact that the number of 
countries in which FTA utilization data are available is limited, however, the data based 
on CoOs provide an important source for examining FTA utilization rates in exports. 
Such data are as useful as customs data on FTA utilization in imports as long as we 
recognize the limitations and problems. In sum, several issues raised in this paper will 
be helpful in computing FTA utilization rates. 
     The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses several 
issues in the computation of FTA utilization rates. The FTA utilization rates in 
Thailand’s trade are reported in Section 3. After further discussing advanced issues on 
the use of FTA utilization data in Section 4, Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
 
2. Measurement of FTA Utilization Rates 
     As mentioned in the introductory section, FTA utilization rates are defined as the 
share of trade values under FTA schemes in the total trade values of FTA eligible 
products. In this section, we discuss several issues in the computation of FTA utilization 
rates. 
 
2.1. General Issues 
This subsection discusses several general issues in computing FTA utilization 
rates. First, the denominator, i.e. the total trade values of FTA eligible products, should 
not include trade values in FTA ineligible products. To do this, it is necessary to 
categorize all products into FTA eligible and FTA ineligible products. FTA eligibility 
differs not only with regard to tariff-line products but also in terms of the years 
concerned. Furthermore, in some FTAs, such as the ASEAN-China FTA (ACFTA) or 
the ASEAN-Korea FTA (AKFTA), a “reciprocal tariff rate treatment” is adopted. 
Roughly speaking, this treatment allows each member not to give preferential access for 
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a product against members who do not sufficiently open that product under ACFTA.2 
This treatment means that products eligible under the ACFTA scheme in exports to 
China differ from ASEAN country to ASEAN country. In sum, the coverage of products 
in the denominator is different in terms of its various dimensions.  
Second, in practice, positive trade values under FTA schemes may appear under 
FTA ineligible products in the original data. Moreover, such positive values appear even 
in the Harmonized System (HS) codes that do not exist. Namely, the numerator may 
include non-zero values for FTA ineligible products or non-existing HS codes. One of 
the reasons for such non-zero values is simply mistakes by customs officers or 
companies. Unless we have a good reason, we should not include these values in the 
calculation of the numerator.3 Thus, it is, in practice, important to check whether the 
numerator does not include trade values under FTA schemes in FTA ineligible products.  
Third, FTA eligible products sometimes do not have lower tariff rates than general 
tariff rates such as MFN rates. In particular, due to reductions in the MFN rates, some 
FTA eligible products have the same tariff rates as the MFN rates, mostly zero, and 
some have even higher preferential tariff rates than the MFN rates. In this case, there are 
basically no advantages to using an FTA. Especially since the use of FTA schemes 
requires exporters, in particular, to bear additional costs, it is natural for firms not to use 
FTA schemes. However, as well as this second issue, trade values under FTA schemes in 
such products are not necessarily zero in the original data. Whether to include those 
products in the computation of FTA utilization rates becomes a difficult question. The 
difficulty lies in the fact that, unlike the second issue, this one is due not only to 
mistakes by companies but also to companies’ rational decision-making. In the case of 
multilateral FTAs, as discussed in Section 4.3, there is a chance that one can enjoy some 
advantages in using FTA rates even if they are not lower than the MFN rates. Thus, 
whether to include these products or not might depend on the purpose behind the 
computation of the FTA utilization rates. 
Fourth, in computing FTA utilization rates, trading country pairs should be in 
                                                   
2 More specifically, Annex 2 in the Agreement on Trade in Goods says: The reciprocal tariff rate 
treatment of tariff lines placed by a Party in the Sensitive Track shall be governed by the following 
conditions: (i) the tariff rate for a tariff line placed by a Party in the Sensitive Track must be at 10% 
or below in order for that Party to enjoy reciprocity; (ii) the reciprocal tariff rate to be applied to a 
tariff line placed by a Party in the Sensitive Track shall be either the tariff rate of that Party’s tariff 
line, or the Normal Track tariff rate of the same tariff line of the other Party or Parties from whom 
reciprocity is sought, whichever is higher; and (iii) the reciprocal tariff rate to be applied to a tariff 
line placed by a Party in the Sensitive Track shall in no case exceed the applied MFN rate of the 
same tariff line of the Party or Parties from whom reciprocity is sought. 
3 One possible reason is that companies fill in CoOs using codes in the earlier HS version (e.g. HS 
2002). 
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common with the numerator and denominator. As examined more closely in Section 4.3, 
in the case of multilateral FTAs, member countries can trade with multiple countries 
under the same FTA scheme. For example, Thai imports under the ACFTA are not 
consistent with Thai imports from China under the FTA scheme. This is because the 
former includes Thai imports from other ASEAN countries under the ACFTA. Thus, in 
computing FTA utilization rates, it is necessary to obtain the data on trade values under 
FTA schemes according to trading partners. 
 
2.2. Export-specific Issues 
     In this subsection, we discuss export-specific issues. There are three points to be 
discussed. First, the data on FTA utilization in exports are not necessarily available. FTA 
utilization data are usually obtained from customs in the case of imports and from CoOs 
in the case of exports. In certifying the “origin” of goods, there are mainly two systems. 
One is “third-party certification”, which refers to the system in which an exporter 
provides a third-party organization (a government or a designated agency) with 
information to prove that its export products satisfy rules of origin (RoOs). Then, the 
third-party organization, upon a judgment of the origin of such products, issues a CoO. 
The other is a self-certification system, in which all exporters certify the origins of their 
products on their own responsibility. Thus, in the case of FTAs adopting the 
self-certification system4, since CoOs are kept in each exporting company, we cannot 
know the whole picture regarding preferential exports. 
Second, as in the case of regular trade data, it is believed that import data are 
more accurate than export data. Particularly in the case of FTA utilization data, it is 
known that the CoO data are likely to overestimate preferential exports. This 
overestimation is because exporters do not necessarily succeed in exporting their 
products under FTA schemes, even if they already have obtained CoOs. For example, as 
found in Hayakawa et al. (2013b), FTA preferential exports in the CoO data are likely to 
be overestimated in products with higher demand volatility or those with a larger 
number of tariff-line products within the same HS six-digit code. Therefore, in 
employing FTA utilization data based on CoOs, we should recognize that the 
preferential exports are likely to be overestimated. As a result, there is even a possibility 
that the preferential exports based on CoOs exceed total exports. 
Third, the source of the data for the denominator of FTA utilization rates becomes 
                                                   
4  For example, these include NAFTA, the US-Australia FTA, the US-Singapore FTA, the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Singapore-New Zealand FTA, the Thailand-New Zealand FTA, the 
Australia-New Zealand FTA, the Mexico-Chile FTA, the US-Korea FTA, and so on. 
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important. There are two kinds of sources here. While one is the data from the exporting 
countries, the other is the data from the importing countries. In the case of the data from 
the exporting countries, the denominator is forced to include the exports of FTA 
ineligible products. This is because FTA eligibility is usually set at the tariff-line level of 
the importing countries, but the comparable trade data in the exporting countries are 
available at an HS six-digit level because the most detailed internationally-comparable 
HS digit is six-digit.5 Thus, unless all tariff-line products in an HS six-digit code are 
FTA eligible products, six-digit level export data from the exporting countries include 
those in FTA ineligible products. On the other hand, employing the tariff-line level data 
from the importing countries allows for the exclusion of FTA ineligible products. 
However, while the numerator from the CoO data in the exporting countries is on an 
FOB basis, the denominator is on a CIF basis, which includes not only pure exports but 
also transport costs. As a result, there is the issue of choosing between biases that arise 
from including the exports in FTA ineligible products and those arising from the 
difference between the CIF basis and the FOB basis. The higher the FTA liberalization 
level is in terms of product number-basis, the smaller the former kind of bias becomes. 
Combining the second and third issues, we can say that the direction of bias is 
ambiguous in the computation of FTA utilization rates that uses CoO data. Due to the 
second issue, the numerator in the utilization rates is always over-estimated. The third 
issue also uncovers the overestimation of the denominator in using either the export or 
import side of the data. As a result, since both the numerator and denominator are 
overestimated, the direction of bias in FTA utilization rates becomes ambiguous in the 
case of using CoO data. 
 
 
3. FTA Utilization Rates in Thailand 
     In this section, after listing the FTAs concluded by Thailand, we compute FTA 
utilization rates for Thailand in 2011. We also give a brief overview of observable fixed 
costs for FTA use. 
 
                                                   
5 The fact that the data on FTA utilization in exports are available at an HS six-digit level also yields 
some problems in econometric analyses of the determinants of FTA utilization rates in exports. In the 
literature, studies listed in the introductory section investigate the role of the tariff margin, i.e. the 
difference between the general and preferential tariff rates. The data on tariff margins are available at 
a tariff-line level, while the dependent variable, i.e. the FTA utilization rates in exports, is defined at 
an HS six-digit level. Thus, it is necessary to aggregate arbitrarily the tariff margin at a tariff-line 
level to that at an HS six-digit level. As a result, the HS six-digit level variable of the tariff margin 
may contain measurement errors. 
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3.1. FTAs 
     As of October 2013, Thailand has concluded several FTAs. Since the launch of 
the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in 1993, Thailand has signed and implemented 
five bilateral FTAs with Australia, New Zealand, India, Japan, and Peru. In addition, 
Thailand, together with the other ASEAN members, has concluded five regional 
agreements with China, Japan, Korea, India, and Australia and New Zealand. Table 1 
summarizes all the FTAs in which Thailand has been engaged. Except for the FTA with 
Peru, which was implemented in 2012, most of the preferential tariffs of traded goods 
are approaching zero. 
 
===   Table 1   === 
 
Before computing the FTA utilization rates, we take a brief overview of the 
observable fixed costs for FTA use by looking at the fees for the issuance of CoOs. 
Table 2 shows the fees for the issuance of CoOs in major ASEAN countries and Japan, 
and it indicates that fees vary depending on the country. Viet Nam and Malaysia do not 
charge any fees for the issuance of CoOs. Instead, they charge only paper fees, which 
are US$1.0 and US$0.4, respectively, meaning that the costs necessary for the issuance 
of CoOs are borne by government subsidies. Thailand and Indonesia also charge 
marginal fees of US$1.0 and US$0.5, respectively. The fees in the other countries vary 
roughly from US$3 to US$25. In the case of Japan, in which Japan’s Chamber of 
Commerce works as the third party for the issuance of a CoO, the fee per CoO costs 
US$25.1. The Cambodian government, under which the competent authority is the 
Ministry of Commerce, charges by far the highest amount among the 10 countries, 
US$50 per CoO, even though the fee for CoOs for small quantities is US$15, if the 
number of items is less than 2,000 for clothing and 200 for shoes.6 
 
===   Table 2   === 
 
                                                   
6 There are some issues regarding the fees for the issuance of CoOs. First, recent and complicated 
logistics demands may require exporters to obtain multiple CoOs for sub-divided goods. For instance, 
in case exported goods are kept in stock in one country and there is re-export of part of the stocks to 
third countries using FTAs, it is necessary to obtain CoOs a number of times. Higher fees are likely 
to hinder the flexible flow of goods utilizing FTAs. Second, while the third party certification system 
requires the competent authority or relevant third party to collect fees in order to cover costs, the 
self-certification system can be free from fees to third parties. However it should be taken into 
consideration that self-certification might increase risks of intended or unintended fraud declarations 
and as a result verification costs might surpass those for maintaining a third party certification 
system. 
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3.2. FTA Utilization Rates in Imports 
     This subsection computes the FTA utilization rates for Thailand’s imports. The 
data on imports under the FTA schemes are obtained from the Thai customs at a 
tariff-line level, i.e. an HS eight-digit level. Those on total imports at a tariff-line level 
are from the World Trade Atlas. Various figures are shown in Table 3. “AANZFTA” 
includes figures only for Australia. “Total” and “Eligible” refer to total imports and 
imports in products with lower preferential rates than MFN rates, respectively. “FTA” 
refers to imports under FTA schemes. In “FTA”, “ALL” and “MFN>FTA” restrict 
products only to all products and products with lower preferential rates than MFN rates, 
respectively. We examine “Others” in the next section.  
 
===   Table 3   === 
 
There are several noteworthy findings in Table 3. As mentioned in Section 2.1, 
the difference between (C) and (D) means that FTA schemes are used in importing even 
products that do not have lower preferential tariff rates than the MFN rates, although 
such a difference in bilateral FTAs (i.e. TAFTA and JTEPA) seem to be simple mistakes 
by companies.7 Here, we focus on the FTA utilization rates for products with the lower 
preferential tariff rates. The total imports for such products and the imports for such 
products under FTA schemes are reported in (B) and (D), respectively. The FTA 
utilization rates when importing such products are shown in (II). From this column, we 
can see that FTA utilization rates are highest in TAFTA (45%), followed by ACFTA 
(40%). JTEPA and AKFTA also have relatively high rates, which are 21% and 22%, 
respectively. In addition to the FTA utilization rates, the share of imports under FTA 
schemes in total imports (i.e. the utility ratio) is also an important measure. This is 
reported in Column (I). In the above, we found the highest FTA utilization rates in 
TAFTA, but such imports under TAFTA occupy just 9% of the total imports.8 The 
highest share can be found in ACFTA at 20%. 
 
3.3. FTA Utilization Rates in Exports 
     Next, we compute FTA utilization rates for Thailand’s exports in Table 4. The 
data on CoOs containing information on FTA use are obtained from Thailand’s Ministry 
of Commerce. We use two kinds of data sources to calculate the denominator, i.e. the 
                                                   
7 As mentioned in Section 2.1., there is a reasonable chance of using FTA schemes in importing 
such products in the case of multilateral FTAs.  
8 This low rate will be because the MFN rate for gold, one of the key imports, is already zero. 
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total trade values, both of which are drawn from the World Trade Atlas. One is the 
importer-side data at a tariff-line level, the other is the exporter-side data (i.e. the Thai 
data) at an HS 6-digit level. As mentioned in Section 3.2, the importer and exporter 
sides of the data enable us to avoid biases resulting from including trade values for 
non-eligible products or from the CIF-FOB difference. “Total”, “Eligible”, “FTA”, and 
“Zero MFN” refer to total exports, total exports in eligible products, exports in eligible 
products under an FTA scheme, and exports in products with zero MFN rates, 
respectively. The figures in “Total” and “Zero MFN” are computed based on the 
importer-side data while those in “FTA” are based on the exporter-side data (i.e. CoO 
data). We compute the figures under “Eligible” by employing both the importer and 
exporter sides of the data. “AANZFTA” includes figures only for Australia. 
 
===   Table 4   === 
 
     There are some more issues that need clarification. First, at an HS 6-digit level, 
exports under FTA schemes are set to zero in the case of HS codes that do not exist. 
Second, as mentioned before, we could not identify whether or not the HS 6-digit level 
data on exports under FTA schemes include those for FTA ineligible products, because 
FTA eligibility is defined at a tariff-line level. Third, we restrict FTA eligible products 
only to those with lower preferential rates than MFN rates. The figures for “Eligible” 
from the importer-side data do not include exports of products that do not have lower 
preferential rates than the MFN rates. Fourth, as mentioned in Section 2.2., in some HS 
6-digit codes, “FTA” exports from CoO data exceed total exports from the importer-side 
data. In computing “FTA”, the exports in such codes are set to total exports from the 
importer-side data. 
     Table 4 shows some interesting numbers. First, as mentioned in Section 2.2., there 
is a gap in the total exports of FTA eligible products between the importer (B) and 
exporter (C) sides of the data. In particular, it is important that the magnitude relation 
between these two depends on the partners involved. Namely, those based on the 
export-side data do not always exceed those based on the import-side data, and vice 
versa. Below, we compute FTA utilization rates based on the importer-side data. The 
second column (II) shows the highest FTA utilization rates in Thai exports under JTEPA 
(75%). Around 50% of the FTA utilization rates can be found in Thai exports under 
TAFTA, ACFTA, and AKFTA. Third, JTEPA shows the highest FTA utilization rates, 
but the share of exports under JTEPA in the total exports from Thailand to Japan is just 
20%. The higher share can be found in exports to Australia under TAFTA (37%). The 
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lower share in the total exports to Japan is because most of these exports are in products 
with zero MFN rates. From column (III), we can see that the exports in such products 
occupy 70% of the total exports from Thailand to Japan. In other words, 10% of the 
exports from Thailand to Japan are exports of FTA ineligible products with positive 
MFN rates or those of FTA eligible products under MFN schemes. 
 
 
4. Advanced Issues on FTA Utilization 
This section further discusses some advanced issues regarding FTA utilization. 
We first examine duty free imports through schemes other than FTAs. Then, it is 
discussed how we measure FTA utilization rates in countries where multiple FTA 
schemes are available. Last, we examine the role of “cumulation” provisions in FTA 
utilization. 
 
4.1. Other Tariff Exemption Schemes 
     In addition to FTA schemes, there are some other schemes for duty free imports 
or imports under lower tariff rates than the MFN rates. If firms can enjoy duty free 
imports with a scheme other than FTAs, they do not need to use FTA schemes. In Table 
3, “Others” includes imports under schemes of bonded warehouses, free zones, 
investment promotion, duty drawbacks under Section 19 bis, and duty drawbacks for 
re-exports. 9  Whether or not to exclude such imports in the calculation of the 
denominator in FTA utilization rates might be a controversial issue. It is obvious that if 
we exclude such imports, FTA utilization rates rise. Indeed, the size of such imports is 
not trivial. The table shows that such imports are much larger than imports under FTA 
schemes in all the sampled exporting countries. Particularly in imports from Japan, the 
share of such imports in total imports, which is reported in column (III), is 44%. This is 
consistent with the fact that foreign direct investment (FDI) from Japan occupies the 
highest share in total inward FDI in Thailand. Namely, a large number of Japanese 
multinational enterprises in Thailand enjoy duty free imports under, say, investment 
                                                   
9 Goods imported under the schemes of bonded warehouses, free zones, and investment promotion 
may be exempted from customs duties, subject to certain conditions. The duty drawback under 
Section 19 bis or for re-exports enables exporting firms to obtain a refund on customs duty paid on 
imported goods when those goods are inputted for goods for export or are re-exported without any 
transformation. Under these schemes, only firms with the approval of the authorities in charge can 
claim such privileges. Eligible imported goods and duty privileges vary among the schemes. For 
example, virtually all goods imported under bonded warehouse and free zone schemes are duty-free. 
Under the investment promotion scheme, raw materials are duty-free while machinery may be either 
duty-free or subject to a 50% tariff reduction. On the other hand, machinery is ineligible for a refund 
on import duty paid under duty drawback schemes. 
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promotion schemes. 
 
4.2. Multilateral FTA versus Bilateral FTA 
     Two countries sometimes have multiple FTA schemes. Such a pair usually has 
both bilateral and multilateral FTA schemes. For example, Thailand has both bilateral 
and multilateral FTA schemes with Australia, India, Japan, and New Zealand. In this 
case, firms’ decisions on FTA use will be qualitatively different from those regarding 
exports to countries with a single FTA scheme. Specifically, firms will choose their 
tariff scheme from general tariff rates (e.g. the MFN rates), bilateral FTA rates, and 
multilateral FTA rates rather than simply between general rates and FTA rates. Another 
issue is the difficulty in computing FTA utilization rates in trade with countries with 
multiple FTA schemes. The source of this difficulty lies in the difference in the 
denominator of FTA utilization rates, i.e. the differences in eligible products among the 
FTA schemes. Thus, for example, we cannot simply aggregate FTA utilization rates in 
two FTA schemes. 
     One simple aggregation is to calculate the denominator by adding trade values in 
products eligible in either an FTA scheme. Table 5 reports imports of Thailand from 
Japan under AJCEP (multilateral FTA) and JTEPA (bilateral FTA), according to these 
FTAs’ eligibility and the magnitude relation in preferential rates between these two 
FTAs. The above-suggested denominator is total imports (1,288 billion THB) minus 
imports in products ineligible in both AJCEP and JTEPA (632 billion THB). The 
numerator is the sum of total imports under AJCEP and JTEPA (1.6 billion THB + 136 
billion THB). As a result, the utilization rate for FTA schemes in imports from Japan is 
21%, which is almost the same as that for JTEPA and much higher than that for AJCEP. 
The trivial difference between the aggregated rates and the JTEPA utilization rates is 
because the total imports under AJCEP (1.6 billion THB) and the total imports of 
products eligible only in AJCEP (8 billion THB) are trivial, compared with imports in 
products that are eligible under JTEPA. 
 
===   Table 5   === 
 
4.3. Cumulation 
     FTAs usually include the provision on “cumulation”. There are three main kinds 
of cumulation rules. In bilateral cumulation, which applies to bilateral FTAs, materials 
originating in one country can be considered as originating in the partner country, and 
vice versa. On the other hand, diagonal cumulation applies to FTAs among more than 
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two countries. In diagonal cumulation, materials originating in one country can be 
considered as originating in all of the FTA partner countries. This enables FTA users to 
cumulate the value of intermediates from not only the exporting country but also from 
other member countries when determining the status of origin for the products to be 
exported. It is also worth noting that full cumulation is more flexible than diagonal 
cumulation, and it allows FTA users to cumulate all materials used in the preferential 
area. In some multilateral FTAs, this rule of diagonal cumulation has been adopted in 
addition to full cumulation (for more details, see, for example, Augier et al., 2005). 
     All ASEAN+1 FTAs include the diagonal cumulation rule. Importantly, this rule 
creates some incentive to use an FTA scheme even if FTA preferential rates are not 
lower than MFN rates. Suppose three countries (A, B, and C) are members of one 
multilateral FTA with a diagonal cumulation provision and that Country B is planning to 
export textile products to Country C under the FTA scheme. Such textile products are 
produced using fabrics made in Country A. Suppose that RoOs in exporting textile 
products require fabrics to originate in Country B. Since diagonal cumulation is allowed 
in this FTA, the fabrics made in Country A can be seen as originating in Country B. 
However, it is necessary for Country B to import fabrics from Country A under the FTA 
scheme, even if the MFN rates in Country B for the fabrics are zero or lower than the 
FTA preferential rates for the fabrics. Thus, if the MFN rates in Country C for textile 
products are very high, Country B imports fabrics from Country A under the FTA 
scheme even if such imports are costly compared with imports under the MFN rates. 
This is one of the reasons for observing positive trade values under FTA schemes for 
products that do not have lower preferential rates than MFN rates, as mentioned in 
Section 2.1. 
     We can check, by examining FTA utilization, how much member countries in 
multilateral FTAs enjoy such cumulation rules. Table 6 reports the utilization values of 
ASEAN+1 FTAs in Thailand’s exports and imports in 2011. It is natural that FTA 
utilization values are large in trading with plus-one countries (e.g., AJCEP utilization 
values in trading with Japan) because ASEAN countries can already enjoy AFTA in 
trading with other ASEAN countries. However, we can find one noteworthy figure, 
AJCEP utilization values in exporting from Thailand to Viet Nam. These are larger even 
than AJCEP utilization values in exports from Thailand to the plus-one country, Japan. 
One of the reasons for such large values in exports to Viet Nam will be due to diagonal 
cumulation. The largest AJCEP utilization values in exports to Viet Nam can be found in 
“Woven fabrics of cotton (HS520932)”. Thus, it is expected that, for example, woven 
fabrics of cotton produced in Thailand are exported to Viet Nam, where the fabrics 
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undergo processes of cut, make, and trim. Then, the garment products are exported to 
Japan under the AJCEP scheme.10 Another interesting observation is the large figure for 
exports to Singapore under multilateral FTA schemes because almost all the products 
have zero MFN rates in Singapore. Thus, it is also expected that some trade, at least 
among Singapore, Thailand, and plus-one countries, enjoys diagonal cumulation rules. 
 
===   Table 6   === 
 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we discussed some practical issues in the computing of FTA 
utilization rates, which are a useful measure for discovering to what extent FTA 
schemes are used in trade. Our practical guidance for the computation of FTA utilization 
rates will be helpful in computing these rates and in examining the determinants of 
these rates empirically. Below, we list the issues raised in this paper. 
 We should carefully classify all products into FTA eligible and ineligible products 
because such FTA eligibility depends not only on each product but also on the year 
and the country pair involved. 
 Check whether or not the data on FTA utilization include trade values under FTA 
schemes in FTA ineligible products or in products of HS codes that do not exist. 
 The positive trade values under FTA schemes may appear for FTA eligible products 
that do not have lower preferential rates than MFN rates. 
 Obtain the data on trade values under multilateral FTA schemes according to the 
trading partners. 
 The CoO data on FTA utilization in exports are available only in the case of FTAs 
that do not adopt a self-certification system. 
 The preferential trade values differ between data from customs and data based on 
CoOs, even for the same trade flow. 
 The denominator of FTA utilization in exports includes biases resulting from the 
                                                   
10 However, taking a closer look at this possibility, we can see something puzzling. Viet Nam has a 
bilateral FTA with Japan (the Japan – Viet Nam Economic Partnership Agreement, JVEPA), which 
entered into force in 2009. Here, textile products are eligible under JVEPA for exports from Viet 
Nam to Japan (but are ineligible under GSP in Japan). Importantly, under JVEPA, a special rule that 
is similar to the diagonal cumulation is available for some products, including textiles. Namely, 
when exporting textile products from Viet Nam to Japan, even under JVEPA, the use of fabrics made 
in Thailand is allowed. This implies that the large AJCEP utilization values in exports from Thailand 
to Viet Nam may not be due to benefits arising from the diagonal cumulation rule in AJCEP. 
Furthermore, there are no differences in terms of preferential tariff rates because the rates for textile 
products are zero in exports to Japan under both AJCEP and JVEPA. 
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inclusion of exports in FTA ineligible products in the case of using export-side data 
or biases resulting from the difference between the CIF basis and the FOB basis in 
the case of using import-side data. 
 FTA utilization rates based on CoO data always contain some biases, in which the 
direction of the bias is ambiguous. 
 It is controversial as to whether or not the trade values under a duty-free scheme 
other than FTAs are excluded in the calculation of the denominator in FTA 
utilization rates. 
 It is controversial as to how we measure single FTA utilization rates for trading pair 
countries with multiple FTA schemes. 
 We may check, by examining FTA utilization according to trading pairs, to what 
extent member countries in multilateral FTAs enjoy the benefits of cumulation 
rules. 
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Table 1. FTAs by Thailand 
FTAs Members Implementation Type
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos,
Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines,
Singapore, Viet Nam, and Thailand
1993 Regional
Thailand-India FTA (TIFTA): Early harvest India and Thailand 2004 Bilateral
Thailand-Australia FTA (TAFTA) Australia and Thailand 2005 Bilateral
ASEAN-China FTA (ACFTA) Brunei, Cambodia, China Indonesia,
Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines,
Singapore, Viet Nam, and Thailand
2005 Regional
Thailand-New Zealand Closer Economic Partnership Agreement (TNZCEP) New Zealand and Thailand 2005 Bilateral
Japan-Thailand Economic Partnership Agreement (JTEPA) Japan and Thailand 2007 Bilateral
ASEAN-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (AJCEP) Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Japan,
Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines,
Singapore, Viet Nam, and Thailand
2009 Regional
ASEAN-Republic of Korea FTA (AKFTA) Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos,
Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Korea,
Singapore, Viet Nam, and Thailand
2010 Regional
ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA (AANZFTA) Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia,
Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, New Zealand,
Philippines, Singapore, Viet Nam, and
Thailand
2010 Regional
ASEAN-India FTA (AIFTA) Brunei, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Laos,
Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines,
Singapore, Viet Nam, and Thailand
2010 Regional
Thailand-Peru Closer Economic Partnership Agreement (TPCEP) Peru and Thailand 2012 Bilateral  
Source: Legal texts of FTAs 
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Table 2. Fees for the issuance of CoOs 
Country Issuing Authority Fee （US$） Notes
Cambodia Ministry of Commerce 50
15 For small quantities
Japan Japan Chamber of Commerce 25.1
Laos Ministry of Industry and Commerce 5 For invoice values < 10,000USD
7.5 For invoice values < 30,000USD
10 For invoice values < 60,000USD
12.5 For invoice values > 60,000USD
Singapore Singapore Customs 4.8 Through Tradenet
8 Manually
Myanmar Ministry of Commerce 3.9 Fee 3.5 + Paper charge 0.4
Philippines Bureau of Customs 3.1 (Stamp fee 2.7 + Paper charge 0.4)
Thailand Ministry of Commerce 1
Vietnam Ministry of Industry and Trade 1 Paper charge
Indonesia Instansi Penerbit Surat Keterangan Asal 0.5
Malaysia Ministry of International Trade and Industry 0.4 Paper charge  
Source: JETRO  
Notes: As of December 2011. Fees are converted to US dollars using annual average rates in 2012, excluding Myanmar. (The average rate between April to 
October 2012 was used due to data restrictions). 
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Table 3. FTA Utilization Rates for Imports (2011, Billion THB) 
Total Eligible Others (I) (II) (III)
Coverage ALL MFN > FTA ALL MFN > FTA ALL
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (D)/(A) (D)/(B) (E)/(A)
AANZFTA 242 41 0.30 0.29 87 0.1% 1% 36%
TAFTA 242 48 27 22 87 9% 45% 36%
ACFTA 930 460 195 185 313 20% 40% 34%
AIFTA 92 26 2.9 2.6 27 3% 10% 29%
TIFTA 92 5 0.68 0.67 27 1% 13% 29%
AJCEP 1,288 439 1.8 1.6 563 0.1% 0.4% 44%
JTEPA 1,288 648 145 136 563 11% 21% 44%
AKFTA 281 135 32 30 109 11% 22% 39%
FTA
 
Sources: Thai Customs; World Trade Atlas 
Notes: “AANZFTA” includes figures only for Australia. “Total” and “Eligible” refer to total imports and imports in products with lower preferential rates 
than MFN rates, respectively. “FTA” refers to imports under FTA schemes. In “FTA”, “ALL” and “MFN>FTA” restrict products only to all products and to 
products with lower preferential rates than the MFN rates, respectively. “Others” includes imports under the schemes of bonded warehouses, free zones, 
investment promotion, duty drawbacks under Section 19 bis, and duty drawbacks for re-exports. 
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Table 4. FTA Utilization for Thai Exports (2011, Million USD) 
Total FTA Zero MFN (I) (II) (III)
Source Import Import Export Export Import
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (D)/(A) (D)/(B) (E)/(A)
AANZFTA 9,947 6,622 5,850 77 2,054 1% 1% 21%
TAFTA 9,947 7,893 5,946 3,723 2,054 37% 47% 21%
ACFTA 38,595 15,044 12,352 8,135 17,397 21% 54% 45%
AIFTA 5,443 4,116 4,056 957 417 18% 23% 8%
AJCEP 23,546 5,866 7,004 40 16,513 0.2% 1% 70%
JTEPA 23,546 6,343 7,475 4,774 16,513 20% 75% 70%
AKFTA 4,974 1,891 2,148 903 2,195 18% 48% 44%
Eligible
 
Sources: Thai Ministry of Commerce; World Trade Atlas 
Notes: “Total”, “Eligible”, “FTA”, and “Zero MFN” refer to total exports, total exports in eligible products, exports in eligible products under FTA schemes, 
and exports in products with zero MFN rates, respectively. The figures in “Total” and “Zero MFN” are computed based on the importer-side data while 
those in “FTA” are based on the exporter-side data (i.e. CoO data). 
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Table 5. Multilateral FTA versus Bilateral FTA for Thai Imports (2011, Billion THB) 
Number of All Imports
AJCEP JTEPA HS codes AJCEP JTEPA
NO NO 2,525 0 0 632
YES NO 70 0.3 0 8
NO YES 309 0 63 217
YES YES AJCEP > JTEPA 2,736 0.2 34 238
YES YES AJCEP = JTEPA 2,537 0.9 39 188
YES YES AJCEP < JTEPA 123 0.2 0.1 4
Total 8,300 1.6 136 1,288
Preferential TariffEligibility FTA Imports
 
Sources: Thai Customs; World Trade Atlas 
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Table 6. Cumulation: FTA Utilization Values for Thailand in 2011 (Thousand USD) 
Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports
Australia 9,781 83,901 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Brunei 0 0 0 7,757 0 238 0 0 0 43
China n.a. n.a. 6,387,569 9,361,301 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Indonesia 0 0 384 28 130 938 0 2,175 136 0
India n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 95,094 1,221,948 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Japan n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 58,003 48,119 n.a. n.a.
Cambodia 0 0 0 116 0 0 0 0 0 0
Korea n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1,037,182 2,214,727
Laos 0 0 13 0 0 0 28 800 0 0
Malaysia 0 0 1,612 333 0 0 382 28 341 239
New Zealand 0 7,919 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Philippines 0 0 337 65 0 0 0 35 0 281
Singapore 602 5,018 2,881 1,574 0 673 0 110 40 1,066
Viet Nam 397 486 1,365 692 0 0 955 57,155 0 132
ASEAN 1,000 5,504 6,592 10,566 130 1,849 1,365 60,302 517 1,761
ASEAN / Total 9% 6% 0% 0% 0% 0% 2% 56% 0% 0%
Total 10,781 97,323 6,394,162 9,371,867 95,224 1,223,797 59,368 108,421 1,037,698 2,216,487
AANZFTA ACFTA AIFTA AJCEP AKFTA
 
Sources: Thai Ministry of Commerce; Thai Customs 
Notes: Under AJCEP, the main imports from Japan are “sanitary products (HS481840)” while the main exports to Viet Nam are “Woven fabrics of cotton 
(HS520932)”. 
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Appendix. FTA Utilization Rates by Section 
 
Table A1. FTA Utilization Rates for Thai Imports in 2011 by Section 
AANZFTA TAFTA ACFTA AIFTA AJCEP JTEPA AKFTA
Live animals 0% 66% 33% 4% 0% 1% 0%
Vegetable products 1% 36% 94% 20% 14% 35% 5%
Animal/vegetable fats and oils 1% 80% 82% 0% 1% 2% 76%
Food products 0% 86% 71% 23% 1% 33% 16%
Mineral products 0% 22% 30% 0% 2% 21% 53%
Chemical products 0% 27% 36% 5% 0% 19% 11%
Plastics and rubber 0% 31% 38% 20% 1% 26% 37%
Leather products 0% 8% 42% 5% 1% 3% 2%
Wood products 0% 77% 21% 2% 0% 0% 6%
Paper products 13% 47% 2% 6% 11% 6% 47%
Textiles 0% 85% 56% 32% 1% 41% 48%
Footwear 0% 33% 26% 1% 0% 14% 23%
Plastic or glass products 0% 39% 69% 30% 0% 16% 23%
Precision metals 0% 14% 16% 0% 0% 7% 0%
Base Metal 2% 67% 43% 26% 0% 44% 47%
Machinery 0% 29% 28% 8% 0% 11% 8%
Transport equipment 0% 15% 36% 1% 0% 15% 17%
Precision machinery 0% 3% 10% 1% 0% 12% 8%
Arms and ammunition 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 2%
Miscellaneous 0% 22% 67% 2% 0% 30% 25%
Art products 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%  
Sources: Thai Customs; World Trade Atlas 
Notes: “AANZFTA” includes figures only for Australia. The FTA utilization rates in this table are computed as in column (II) in Table 2. 
 
24 
 
Table A2. FTA Utilization Rates for Thai Exports in 2011 by Section 
AANZFTA TAFTA ACFTA AIFTA AJCEP JTEPA AKFTA
Live animals 53% 0% 0% 55% 80%
Vegetable products 0% 52% 73% 7% 0% 80% 36%
Animal/vegetable fats and oils 83% 10% 68% 0% 0% 99% 76%
Food products 0% 74% 73% 57% 1% 83% 41%
Mineral products 0% 0% 67% 19% 0% 43% 63%
Chemical products 0% 63% 84% 38% 0% 87% 48%
Plastics and rubber 1% 60% 61% 30% 1% 79% 69%
Leather products 0% 40% 5% 4% 0% 58% 27%
Wood products 1% 44% 20% 49% 3% 55% 44%
Paper products 0% 68% 46% 37%
Textiles 16% 35% 35% 35% 1% 56% 39%
Footwear 7% 44% 43% 11% 3% 76% 17%
Plastic or glass products 1% 71% 27% 27% 0% 61% 29%
Precision metals 0% 92% 3% 0% 0% 77% 18%
Base Metal 0% 30% 17% 14% 0% 71% 45%
Machinery 2% 28% 13% 20% 0% 80% 42%
Transport equipment 0% 46% 35% 24% 3%
Precision machinery 19% 38% 3% 16% 0% 6% 15%
Arms and ammunition 0% 0% 0% 0%
Miscellaneous 0% 74% 32% 13% 0% 88% 59%
Art products 0%  
Sources: Thai Ministry of Commerce; World Trade Atlas 
Notes: “AANZFTA” includes figures for only Australia. The FTA utilization rates in this table are computed as in column (II) in Table 3. 
 
